"Karl Marx, Literary Landlord" - Brian L Frye

 A sincere look at Mr Frye

I welcome you to the blog once more. I recently found a small essay by a 'Brian L. Frye' from the University of Virginia in their Journal of Law and Technology, vol. 25 no.5 from 2022, which was an interesting read, to say the least. I then also found an article from 2005 by Mick Brooks on the same topic on the site 'In Defence of Marxism'. What interested me, however, was their sheer difference in quality.

On the one hand, Mr Frye talks to us about Marx being a 'Literary Landlord' and proceeds to demonstrate to us how Marx wanted to abolish private property of the means of production, while also reserving the right to be credited for the ideas he brought forth, along with the economic reward that came with their sale in books. We must take this moment to remind ourselves that Marx died sick and destitute, and made a living off his writing. 

Now, Mr Frye says that wanting to abolish the private property of the means of production is contradictory to wanting to own your own ideas' economic fruits in a capitalist society. Mr Brooks says that by logic, intellectual property rights enclose ideas to limit their use and thus exploit them despite costing nothing. We see that the main difference between Frye and Brooks, is that one blames Marx for wanting to make money off his works (along with rightly critiquing the firm that 'owns' the copy rights to Marx's works), the other points to capitalist ownership of ideas as the 'fetter on the development of the productive forces'. The thing they have in common, is that the holding of intellectual property rights of work alien to the owner's pen in order to profit from it is a shameless theft like any other capitalist's. What they don't have in common is wanting Marx to abolish private property of the sale of his work, which is the standpoint Mr Frye chooses to adopt.

The opinion of yours truly regarding this, is that Marx's work should be of collective ownership, a common good, as Brooks rightly puts it; however, Mr Frye's spoony and lazy criticism of Marx for wanting to be credited for his contributions (which he by the way never disallowed the credited use of by others as a scientific communist) in the same fashion as a scientist wants to be credited for discovering something new, while being able to sell copies of his works (which in no way contradicts his ideology), is a nonsensical, boorish, opinology. 

He calls authors landlords, when it is the publishers and their bourgeois associates that extract the 'rent' from the work of the authors and the print workers! Meanwhile, Mr Frye blames Marx for wanting to make money off his own work that he wrote. What is true for Brooks, and for Marx for that matter, is that science and art are a common good. Capitalist production never ceases to keep the collective from use by the collective, and in all senses, when Marx sought a publisher for his books along with a margin of profit which he wouldn't be dividing between the printers and editors, or the advertisers, but with the publisher Otto Meissner, who had also published Engels' work (Found in a wikipedia article) he was, in few words, a bourgeois hypocrite ! In the same way in which he put it in his silly essay:

Sick burn. Unfortunately, Marx was long dead and couldn't respond.

What I think, is that criticizing a dead man who lived in abject poverty for wanting credit and to make money off his work, instead of treating it as the tragic irony of his material reality under capitalist production, is a seriously stupid "point" to try -- and fail -- to make.

However, the valid point which he makes, is the exclusion of Jenny Westphalen from a credit in transcription of his works and the wider ideological discussions she participated in, which were omitted by Marx. One could argue they weren't necessary to credit, given the fact we take ideas from others without noticing, and that to credit every influence on you would be outright impossible, but it is a good point to criticize the omission of Ms Westphalen from the formation of Marx's ideas. I am of the opinion that it would be right to include Ms Westphalen when naming Marx and Engels, as well, and remember her contributions to the field in bringing her own ideas to Marx's discourse. In a word, I agree with Frye here, despite his shortcomings.

Another point we must dwell on, are his meaningless additions to the essay, which we must see:

"However, the title page of the first edition of Capital included the phrase, “Das Recht der Uebersetzung wird vorbehalten” or “The right of translation is reserved.” In other words, Marx was claiming the exclusive right to publish translations of Capital, presumably under the copyright laws of other countries."

"While he probably realized that asserting copyright ownership in Germany was pointless, apparently he hoped it might be valuable in other countries, if Capital proved commercially successful."

"And it came to pass. Between 1872 and 1875, Marx asserted his translation right under French copyright law to prepare the authentic French translation of Capital. Notably, his contract with the publisher stipulated that the book be sold at a price “which all can afford.” After all, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." 

What a mensch." 

"One can hardly blame Marx for capitulating to the realities of publication in a capitalist society."

(Earlier on in his essay:

"It seems everyone’s a landlord, at least when it comes to what they truly love. Marx loved his theory of communism so powerfully, he couldn’t see that what he truly wanted - what he desperately needed - was to own it, just like any other landlord. But ownership is the problem, especially when it comes to nonrival goods like ideas. Marx’s ironic landlordism could only undermine the credibility of the ideas he loved so well. So, if you love an idea, set it free. The hypocrisy you avoid is likely to be your own."

Compare, then, the product of Marx's work, to the appropriation of the means of production and land to charge a rent; The 'savant serieux' strikes again, with his ignorant opinions! 

(Later on)

"In fairness, Marx didn’t really advocate the total abolition of private property. Rather, he argued that communism requires collective ownership of the “means of production,” but doesn’t preclude private ownership of personal property. As he put it, “Communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society; all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the labour of others by means of such appropriations.”23 In other words, people can own consumption goods, but not the land and factories necessary to make them." 

He demonstrates that he understands what Marx meant, and then proceeds to attempt to analyze how it holds with Marx's view on copyright and intellectual property. 

"So, can that distinction salvage Marx’s belief in the legitimacy of literary property? Maybe copyright and attribution are forms of personal property consistent with Marxist theory."

Copyright, when placed in the hands of a publishing house, is the capitalist expropriation of the worker's ideas, as his critique of Lawrence & Wishart argues. But then, he says this. 

"Yes, authors are “workers,” when they are producing works of authorship. But when the work is done, the author becomes a copyright owner, and the worker becomes the landlord. As many Marxists have long realized, “intellectual property” is just as capitalistic as any other kind." 

(Should read: Intellectual property by the firm is just as capitalistic as any other kind.)

Translation:
'The worker, when they stop working, and own what they have produced, are bourgeois. The author partaking in the fruits of their labour is bourgeois.'

(Recall this):
"One can hardly blame Marx for capitulating to the realities of publication in a capitalist society."

What he says then, is that workers, appropriating the products of their work, and owning them, is bourgeois, and more akin to landlords owning land than the money-grubbing publishers that "share in the booty" as Marx put it, with their collaborators. He in fact outlines how copyright in capitalist society, as it is used, for example, to suppress Marxist Internet Archive, and as Brooks analyzes in his article, are bourgeois; then, he walks into a rake, and calls the workers' personal property of their work, and their right to attribution, bourgeois! 

The notion shown here by Mr Frye, is what the rest of this essay rests on. Thus, we won't go into it here. 

Some sort of conclusion

As we have seen, Mr Frye was unconcerned by the actual validity of his argumentative essay, and was, rather, just coming up with funny section titles for it as a joke. Examples of his 'zingers':

-Karl Marx, Copyright Cop

-Karl Marx, Plagiarism Policeman

-Karl Marx, Chauvinist (This section was half-assed)

-Karl Marx, Plagiarist (Mind you, in it he proves nothing and shows he doesn't have any understanding of allusions, admitting his own argument was weightless)

References:

Article on Otto Meissner, in German.  https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_Meissner_(Verleger)#Literatur 

Mr Frye's Essay

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3948861

Mr Brooks' Article

https://marxist.com/intellectual-property-rights221105.htm

Achtung. Achtung. 

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Critique of 'Architecture as a Sexual Technology'

Before we begin

This article is meant completely to be an honest questioning of what the article by Jaime Solares even meant in the first place, and a further investigation of what he might have missed in his own analysis. I am of the sincere hope that I am incorrect in critiquing this piece, as it makes some decent questions.

Link to original article: https://www.archdaily.com/965361/architecture-as-sexual-technology 

Premise

We must begin with a first analysis of the meaning of sexuality as a "sexual technology", according to Jaime Solares' own definition of what Foucault said. It is to be noted that as I have not read Foucault (nor could I find any information of this being said by him), I will attempt to understand the definition from a purely linguistic standpoint. 

The definition of technology according to Britannica is 'the application of scientific knowledge to the practical aims of human life or ... to the change and manipulation of the human environment.' I bring up this first definition as Solares describes sexuality as a technology that is sexual, which must bring us to the first point of what that entails. Sexuality, according to the Cambridge dictionary, has many meanings that all converge on a fact of sexual feeling, of a capacity to feel and express sexual feeling. We come to this first definition: 'someone's ability to experience or show sexual feelings' and then 'the fact or action of showing [those feelings]'. What we see is that Solares is saying the following: 1. That sexuality is derived from a place of scientific knowledge applied to the practical field of sex itself. 2. That this scientific knowledge is liable to changes in what we'll refer to as technique or the skillful application of knowledge, and thus in the change of the mode of production. 3. That the mode of production, as it directly influences social relations and is influenced by them in its own applications, as is the union of opposites; influences sex as a part of social relations. 

Given these 3 propositions, we must examine what Solares says next, 'This way, the relationship between architecture and the body (!) is shaped not only by the built object, with its various spatial mechanisms for the production of bodies (?), but also by thinking, in the form of academic discourse (The discourse in question relates to physical needs of the person occupying an architectural work). And vice versa (The production of bodies determining its own relationship with architecture), since gender and sexuality also impact architectural theory(!). One way or another, these relationships are very rich and capable of expanding our knowledge about architecture and the creation of generic sexed bodies (??).'

What I am obliged to point out in this paragraph is the lack of a clear explanation of the topic at hand, which reveals itself in the author's choice of writing out a concept and not bothering to explain his meaning as though it is apparently clear. Regardless, the 'production of bodies', immediately calls to mind the reproduction of human bodies through sexual activity, which the author is quick and right to point out as related to architecture given our own physical manifestation being a human body which has needs which architecture has historically been developed to respond to; but how sexuality as the expression of sexual feeling comes into play in the *shaping* of architecture is yet to be answered by our very heroic connoisseur. Let's look at the matter a little more closely.

'With the recognition of these sexual indicators in architecture (which ones?), the relationship between body and space witnessed a significant breakthrough in the 1970s (How?). Feminism has been the guiding principle of this approach, especially by seeking a feminine/feminist know-how (a gender-focused architectural technique which you refuse to talk about?), clearly pointing out the contradictions (?) in the concept (??) of sexual difference (?!?).'

What we must first point out is the recidivism of the author in not even bothering to explain his own thesis apart from the very pleasant and intellectually stimulating first concept of 'sexuality as a sexual technology', which he very egregiously refuses to relate fully to this paragraph while again glossing over what he was supposed to explain while deciding to declare sexual differences as a mere ideal concept and not a concept that finds itself reflected in the material existence of the human body as separated by a difference in sexual functioning which nevertheless finds common elements in various expressions which are located on a biological spectrum (see: Intersex people, sex change surgery, and so on). What is particularly strange, is this evident truth of sexual difference and field of similarities not exhibiting any internal contradictions except in their own differences which (all the while!) become a common field for noticing the different physical needs of each sex (which can vary, and do not 'erase' the fact of difference!). In this way, to say there is a contradictory nature to the concept of the sexes having different needs is a frankly ridiculous statement. Let us continue.

'The same thing happens ('what same?') when we try to determine which architecture would be "gayer"(?): Phillip Johnson's (an openly homosexual) or Le Corbusier's (an openly heterosexual), for example (Show, don't tell?). In both cases, we see a line of thought that, despite its groundbreaking nature, still reproduces instrumental and determinist essentialism, which associates sexual identities with sexed spaces (...?).' 

To fully understand what Solares is saying, we must first examine the architectural styles employed by both of the architects through images.

Phillip Johnson

1. Glass House

As we can very crystal clearly see, this is a glass house. The architect was openly homosexual and at one point a fascist, but that is beyond our scope. 

We can see some similarities to Le Corbusier's exact lines and simple geometric shapes, though this has a distinct break-away from common modernism due to the 'totality' of the glass panes. The interior being completely visible from the outside certainly connects to an idea of being visible, perhaps overly so, in a 'showy' way. We can deduce that this showiness could or could not be attributed to literally anything in the character of Phillip Johnson. I would argue that this "daring" piece attempts to call back to his being openly homosexual. "I want to be seen." 

2. AT&T Building

Here we can again see this desire for simple shapes, though he "daringly" places that negative circle at the top to make it look slightly like a crown, I'd suppose. The high glass panes also raise up the image, to give it a more 'magnific' look. 

Now, let's look at the other guy.

Le Corbusier

1. Villa Savoye

Here we see what we will see in every Le Corbusier building, sadly.

2. Villa Roche

It is when he decides to play around with colors that his work becomes marginally better, but remains a total bore. I wish I could say I liked his style enough to say good things about it.

3. Pavillon Le Corbusier

The cubic parts are okay. 

Returning to Mr Solares' proposition, we ask ourselves: is there a way to distinguish which one is 'gayer'? We have demonstrated that, by engaging with the aesthetic and purpose of the building, we can in fact determine that there is a possibility that sexuality and more prominently social relations, can influence the design of a glass house to be a reflection of the user and designer's own ideas. Such as "being seen" and "being part of the world" possibly relating to the invisibility of gay people in general in current and former day society, which is why he insisted on being 'daringly visible'. In terms of his idea that the architectural style of modernism associates sexual identities with sexed spaces, the usage of the style in given buildings is what dictates this association, not its mode of appearance.  

Moving on, we see this paragraph emerge from his mind.

'In the field of architectural theory, this tension develops in several ways. When Diana Agrest explores the presence of nature in her works, always associated with the feminine, she questions a project of civilization that is based on male domination (You miss the forest for the trees). While rethinking the values of ornament and decoration, also considered essentially feminine (?!), Jennifer Bloomer disrupts the paradigm of form/function and changes the negative meaning (???) of these elements in the history of architecture. And when Ann Bergren and Elizabeth Grosz, as well as Paola Berenstein, argue that the khôra* is a carnal and feminine place (???), they are establishing the world on new foundations (!!!?). For these reasons (which ones?), it might be more interesting to stop automatically making an association between curvy and feminine (Does architecture do that?) and rather begin to unravel the historical motivations that led to these anthropomorphic associations. (Take us there)

*The khôra is the relationship between humans and their environment

I needn't comment much on this, but nature being associated with femininity presumably due to the concept mother nature and its 'birthing' quality is a good association coming from Gaia in Greek mythology being literal Mother Nature, though to explore this aspect is to say nothing new. As for the part on ornamentation and decoration, the view of them as feminine is reactionary and inaccurate; and ornamentation never had much of a negative meaning apart from the class angle (see: Baroque/Rococo). In the case of the khora being a 'carnal' and 'feminine' place, it is a shamelessly nonsensical and fetishistic (in the archaic sense) conclusion to draw from the concept of space, while repeating the discourse of "Mother Nature", only abstracting it from the natural, earthly aspect, and claiming to have invented black string. Mr Solares' claim that people associate curvy and feminine is grounded in the common view of common men, which is a social aspect we won't go into here; it is rather interesting to associate this with architectural form, though I don't trust him to explain his analysis. 

'As for the program, it is imperative to fight for feminist demands such as increasing the number of day-care centers and installing baby changing stations in all restrooms, which also need to be reviewed according to the needs of transgender people (good catch). These debates about typology and functional programs engage our field in the question of identity in a positive way. This happens when differentiation actually works towards the humanization of those who are different, and not towards the discriminatory reproduction of this difference.'

In this paragraph, which connects back to one we already analyzed, he proceeds to refer to the differences in needs of the sexes which he claimed was conceptually contradictory, and demonstrates that they in fact exist, and then says that the differentiation, when viewed in the way we have already described, as that of equity in difference, contributes to the question of identity positively. If anything, Solares seems to like contradicting himself to make his points really *pop*!

'With that said, does feminist architecture make sense? Yes and no. Yes, because the feminist agenda fights hard against the androcentric system in architecture, seeking to overcome the sexism that thrives in our practice (by adapting to the different needs of the sexes and make woman-made architecture be given the notability it should be given). And no (?) because, as Richard Williams states, feminist architecture is not simply the physical expression of a political and theoretical agenda (It is the manifestation of a function that is to be satisfied according to said 'agenda'). This contradiction (It co-exists without problems, mind you) reminds us of architect Susana Torre's answer to the persistent questions about feminine characteristics in women's projects. According to her, it would be better to reflect on how the project absorbs the problems raised by feminism, and not if there is a feminist way to design (To adapt design to solving the problems of both sexes). This is consistent with the ideas of Dorte Kuhlmann, who states that feminist architecture must "articulate in detail how the sexed body merges with the spatial environment to form a continuous but differentiating flesh of the world. (a tautological thought overcome by merely having a gender critical view)"

'This amalgamation of the strings of reality is essentially an ontological reflection (The collective body of architecture reflects our existence, another tautology). In this sense, body and building are entities that no longer repel each other (Like they ever did?). A building is no longer an immune system of surveillance and reification of deviant individuals, but a device that builds itself through the relationship (Design dictates this, another tautology). Like Donna Haraway's cyborg, a hybrid of machine and organism, or like the camp homosexual, Marcia Ian's female bodybuilder, or Jota Mombaça's monster-body, the body is itself a building (This line of thought has been expressed for years). This "space of biopolitical construction which is the body," in the words of Paul Preciado, can be a center of resistance to the universalism that has erased the body’s corporeal features, subsuming the contingencies of the masculine, white, cisgender, heterosexual body prototype.'

Solares again comes to us with tautological statements passed off as a socially revolutionary method, as something that indeed has just been seen, and not something that women experience in society daily.

'The theoretical richness found when associating space, gender, and sexuality (Space and sexual difference in equity is a core part of the problems Design needs to solve, no?) also lies in two major themes: queer and trans (What now?). Aaron Betsky's concept of queerness talks about a sense of emptiness of the body resulting from the necropolitical processes of a heteronormative society (Translation: Queerness is a feeling of social alienation). But it also concerns the sublimation of the body as a fixed point and praises the qualities of adaptation, transversality, and relationality of this body that is constantly reshaping itself (So it's fixed but constantly reshaping itself?). Like gay nightclubs, BDSM, or any space for forbidden sexualities, queer spaces and queerness are events, determined more by practice than by design (The obvious is designed as the fundamental). This counter-construction creates unrecognizable ambivalent spaces, and therefore perfect for the production and reproduction of orgasms (What a coup de grace). This void, mind you, is very different from the functionalist void of modern architecture (Point for him to critique functionalism, though it's low-hanging fruit).'

I need only remark on his statement that the 'counter-construction' of a non-space by the practice of 'forbidden sexualities' creates a void (he means space) for reproducing orgasms is another pure tautology, though disguised by political discourse. What I mean by this is that the adaptation of space to human needs by changes in its use value is a fundamental characteristic of human habitation and historical progress. A mansion can turn into an orphanage merely by a change in the people who use them, an orphanage can turn into a communal house, and the communal house into a gay meeting place just because the people who existed within it changed. What he is saying is, again, a tautology as has been common in this article.

'Modern spaces were based on a binary logic of penetrator-penetrated (rephrasing something doesn't equal a new discovery) and were seen as a continent of human action, a kind of womb to be occupied by the active and dominating body of the public man (Refer to previous note). Queerness, on the contrary, is not a passive void but an active void, always inferred, suggestive, a kind of palimpsest of human flesh impregnated in the walls. It is the opposite, like a scorched-earth policy, guerrilla strategy, marginal survival.'

What Solares again refers to without thinking it is the changes in use by human habitation. He says nothing new, and nothing of note, apart from the 'reproduction of orgasms' line, which I have to say, was clever.

'But queer is still viewed as a cisnormative model in theoretical discourses (The reason why this is the case is that the naming of an identity as queer implies it being different and alien to regular social relations). It doesn't embrace the more radical critique of the nature of the body as produced by the trans theory (Tell us about it?). As Lucas Crawford reminds us, "If the queer theory has expanded the perception of architectural designs that are reshaped to address a gay subculture, then trans theory suggests a model that goes beyond cisgender-centered design." (In reality, designing for people's needs to be satisfied can be done without this theory) While reflecting on the materiality of trans bodies and their architecture, the author proposes a series of procedures that explore these connections, what he calls transing. He speaks, for example, of cross-programming (?), a kind of subversion of the programs designed by the architect toward unexpected occupations (???). Therefore, he emphasizes the fact that the design is just one among the various elements that constitute a space (Yes, by 'othering' a certain program to another occupation you reinforce the idea that it is equitable to everything else), and that architecture is an ongoing project that never ends. (Is architectural theory focused on stating the obvious?)'

'The aesthetic operation of transing, or transitioning (He means changes in use value again), overturns once and for all any ahistorical pretension of the normative dissimulations of power and reveals that the notions of public and private are ideological (They are quite in fact a product of economic relations and historical development). While queerness is characterized as an absence (He means a difference), trans is pure materiality, in constant transformation (The whole point of a transition is that it ends, trans bodies aren't in constant transformation, they are subject to a transformation once). Identity becomes an event rather than a rigid presence (He tautologically refers to changes in use value, again). The trans theory has endless contingencies, requiring a structure capable of producing more bodies than those tossed into the world (It quite actually dialectically overcomes bodies to create new ones while leaving the quantitiy of them intact). It totally rejects the last instances of essentialism because, as trans activist Amanda Palha says, "transfeminist political actions, (...) are legitimized with one condition: questioning the naturalness of sex. (Sex comes to us at birth, we change it through negation)"

"In other words, the body is a social construct, not an object of nature (???). And, when surrounded by unknown forces, it cannot be expected to fully recognize itself, but rather to constantly re-create itself, like space in architecture. Modern transparency no longer exists."

This quote seems to try to overcome the body as a product of nature, and also to try again to associate sexuality to changes in use value, which are neutral to sexuality, while being unable to negate the fact that is a product of natural processes, which we change through technique that imbues us with alternate natural processes, curiously never negating the fact we come from nature.

'The prevalence of this spatial revolution is the foundation for a reflection on Henri Lefebvre's differential spaces. If space is the product of social reality, created through and within the body and its movements, inscribing practices of sexuality and identity on these bodies will produce the most diverse spaces (He again refers to the changes in use value). Moreover, reclaiming the sense of love and affection of the individual towards his or her place challenges the modern functionalism that has repeatedly disincarnated the body through an optical logic. (Should've critiqued functionalism from the start) Recovering the other senses means reconnecting the body in its entirety, thereby being able to produce another architecture. When Foucault says that the body "has no place, but every possible place emerges and radiates from it," he inverts the primacy that space forms the body (Mind you, if space formed us and not matter, we'd be as empty as the ideas of this essay). The modern liberation machines do not understand that freedom is a practice (??) and that no construction can lead to or create this liberation (!)'

Mr Solares says that construction doesn't lead to liberation, and then says that an alliance of bodies would be enough to reconstruct architecture globally; which would mean that this alliance (his alliance) does not seek liberation. 

"The agora must be reinvented. No longer as utopia (!) - since it ignores the presence of the body by definition (It requires people and thus bodies to even be of use) - nor as heterotopia (It is a plaza that discriminates and hasn't been present for a while) - since exceptional spaces generate difference but do not produce everyday life (It is the union of public and private space that generates it) - but as a ruin (Explain?). Infiltrating, inverting, occupying, and hacking (You are trying way too hard here) the agora means reinterpreting its political power of representing all forms of life in the city (It in fact, didn't do that). An alliance of bodies that are unable to see themselves, fragile and shattered, but which, under this condition, can rebuild themselves and reconstruct the very architecture of the world, creating ruptures and opening paths.'

We see here, that this 'alliance of bodies' seeks to make no real change.

'This essay (Explains the lack of rigor!) was developed based on the final considerations of the Master's Dissertation titled Gender and Sexuality in Architecture Theory, presented in 2020 at the School of Architecture and Urbanism of the University of Sao Paulo - FAU USP. 

*According to French philosopher Jacques Derrida, Khôra (also chora) is a receptacle through which everything passes, that which precedes discourse, whose function is to receive everything without leaving any impression or taking any shape of its own. Radical otherness.'

In the case of this final note, what Derrida refers to, I think, is nothing but the process of thought arising from the physical existence of Humans. Additionally, to say something that receives all without leaving impression or taking any shape of its own is 'feminine' or 'radical otherness' (aka the queerness he advocates) is seriously ridiculous. Why would you associate femininity or queerness with being an amorphous nothingness that produces no effect on anything? 

conclusions

This essay was a disappointment. The overuse of tautology to attempt to make a coherent point while missing the great aspect of architecture as a practice suited to human needs which change with the passing of history was lazy.

As a final note, I seriously mean no offence to Mr Solares. It is noticeable that this was a work of passion for feminism and a serious attempt at the examination of architecture from an aesthetic standpoint, though it confused changes in use value as being directly linked to sexuality and omitted all else in order to make the point be logically "sound". 

Thank you for reading to the end, I hope you enjoyed this critique and I also hope that any mistakes on my part are critiqued as well. 

Achtung. Achtung.

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